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The judgment of 29 April 2021 quashing parts of the Climate Protection Act (CPA)
has made history. Not only because the First Senate of the BVerfG put an end
to deferring the reduction of greenhouse gasses to the future, or at least to the
next government. But because this turn to the future came in the form of a turn to
international law and institutions. It is precisely by relying on international law that
the court overcomes the counter-majoritarian difficulty commonly tantalizing climate
litigation and human rights law generally. The most astonishing fact is, however,
that the court entirely avoids the tragic choice between supposedly undemocratic
international commitments and the democratic legislature. I argue that it does so by
approaching constitutional law in a decidedly postcolonial perspective.
The turn to international law may not come entirely unexpected, at least for the First
Senate. The international image of the BVerfG may well be framed by the case law
of the Second Senate, which not only famously declared the CJEU’s Weiss judgment
as “simply untenable” last year, but also showed in its Treaty Override judgment that
it has even less inhibitions to discard international agreements if the legislature so
desires. By contrast, the First Senate has a track record of international openness.
After deciding in the “right to be forgotten” cases to switch from confrontation to
cooperation in matters of fundamental rights protection, the First Senate went on
to hold the government to account for fundamental rights infringements committed
abroad.
The novelty of this case, however, consists in the skillful entanglement of
international law and institutions with constitutional law, which provides the basis for
the BVerfG’s development of a constitutional temperature brake. This reflects quite
the opposite attitude of the Second Senate’s strategic use of domestic constitutional
identity to constrain EU action. One might argue that it reflects a truly international,
if not postcolonial approach to constitutional law. I will summarize my arguments by
tracing three decisive steps in the court’s reasoning.
International Reports as Reflective Equilibrium
A first stumbling block for fundamental rights litigation consists in the challenge to
make broadly phrased rights justiciable in a given context. This process usually
requires reliable projections about the future course of events. Many suits end here
because projections diverge to an extent that makes it impossible for judges to
interfere. Growth projections in austerity cases are an excellent example. Not so
here. The BVerfG crucially relies on the expertise provided by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The reliability of the IPCC, whose working
methods the BVerfG recalls in some detail, results not only from its high level of
expertise and the wealth of information taken into account. One also has to see
it as a function of the international nature of this institution. It ensures multiple
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perspectives and saves us from the risk of parochialism inherent in a purely national
point of view. In this regard, the BVerfG’s use of IPCC reports resuscitates the
functionalist hope in international institutions as havens of rational discourse, a
rare quality in times of societal polarization, spreading autocracy, mistrust in public
institutions, and even state-sponsored misinformation. While one might be forgiven
to be skeptical about information from governments, it seems impossible for one, or
even a group of actors or states to significantly influence an institution like the IPCC.
Even if this first hurdle is taken, public interest litigation often ends here, as it is far
from obvious how projections about future events would translate into constitutional
duties to protect. One common way of addressing this challenge is by relying on
minimum core obligations. That, however, hardly gives teeth to public interest
litigation. In this case like in many others, it is impossible to demonstrate a flagrant
lack of action on the part of the state, or to prove that the measures adopted are
blatantly insufficient. Along these lines, the First Senate argues that a violation of the
duty to protect life would need to show that adjustment measures protecting lives
despite rising temperatures would be unavailable (para 164). Otherwise, it is up to
the government’s discretion.
That discretion is difficult to contest if democratic structures work well, but
problematic if certain groups of affected people are underrepresented, or not
represented at all. In the case at hand, this includes people living outside Germany,
but dramatically affected by climate change, and future generations.
The Duty to be a Good Global Citizen
As to the former, the BVerfG in a second step recognizes that the duty of the
German government to protect fundamental rights does not end at its borders,
but covers people abroad, including the group of plaintiffs living in Nepal and
Bangladesh. This step is the consequent extension of the First Senate’s decision
from last year in a case implicating German foreign intelligence, in which it extended
the reach of fundamental rights beyond the borders of the state. Nevertheless, due
to the at best indirect influence of the government on events outside Germany’s
borders, the duty to protect only applies in a modified, reduced manner compared
to domestic cases. The court holds that the government has met its duties to protect
in the case at hand, particularly by ratifying the 2015 Paris Agreement. While this
fact causes the foreign plaintiffs in the specific instance to lose their case, it could
be of immense significance in future cases where the only way to overcome global
problems is international cooperation. Foreigners may henceforth compel Germany
to live up to its duties as a good global citizen. It does not take much fantasy to
imagine pandemic responses as a case for future application.
The International Dimension of Constitutional
Identity
The fame of the case, however, hinges on the intergenerational issue addressed
in a third step. Here, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is particularly challenging,
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akin to a tragic choice between democracy today and liberty tomorrow. The BVerfG,
however, finds the impossible middle ground and holds the legislature accountable
to its own commitments. What sounds like a tale by Baron Münchhausen is in reality
the result of a skillful entanglement of constitutional and international commitments.
Article 20a of the Basic Law stipulates the preservation of the natural foundations of
life. That, the court concludes, comprises a specific temperature target. But how to
define this target if not through the legislature, which would lead the attempt to bind
the legislature by that target ad absurdum? The court points out that the legislature
intended to implement the target of the Paris Agreement when setting its national
target (para. 209). As international commitments are the only way of preserving
the natural foundations of life, the background of the Paris Agreement therefore
lends constitutional force to the legislative target of capping the temperature rise at
below 2°C and ideally at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (paras. 197 et seq., 210).
This appears all the more reasonable as international agreements cannot lightly be
changed or replaced.
The contrast to the Second Senate’s zero sum approach to international
commitments possibly could not be greater. In the First Senate’s view, international
commitments do not threaten domestic constitutional autonomy, but are expressions
of that constitutional autonomy. By acting internationally, the government and
legislature are giving meaning to constitutional commitments; the content of the latter
does not reveal itself independent of international agreements. This is, in a nutshell,
what constitutional identity could mean in an age of immense global challenges.
Reading the constitution from the angle of international commitments accepts in truly
postcolonial fashion how the latter influences the former, how the self is construed by
the other, and by attempts to define a common ground.
The implications of this postcolonial turn are potentially far-reaching. Take budgetary
autonomy, for example. In an interconnected world, one can only prosper if others
do, too. Would there be a need to protect EU citizens from the impact of a monetary
union created and sustained by all member states, including Germany? Or would its
budgetary autonomy and budgetary targets have to be weighed against the need to
control climate change? The latter is not a mere theoretical possibility, as austerity
is looming large in a post-Covid world of the near future, and climate action may be
one of its victims. It is hard to predict the outcome of pending cases against Next
Generation EU or the PEPP policy of the ECB, not least since the Second Senate
is in charge of them. If, however, the court wants to preserve the impression of unity
(as it did here), the Second Senate would have to take up the idea that cooperation
may be the best way of securing autonomy.
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